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Broadening WTO membership: key accession issues 
WTO membership is still less than universal. Although most developed and many 
developing countries are WTO members, fully one third of the world’s population, 
accounting for about ten per cent of world trade and five per cent of world GDP, lived 
in countries outside the WTO system at the end of 1999 (Langhammer/Lücke 1999: 
table 1).  
The good news is that most of these countries (most prominently, China) have ap-
plied to join the WTO. However, while current WTO members have welcomed this 
move in principle, that welcome has not translated into swift and successful acces-
sion negotiations. From 1995 through 1999, only seven countries that were not pre-
viously contracting parties to GATT 1947 were admitted to the WTO (in chronological 
order, Ecuador, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Panama, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Estonia). Another 
33 countries are now at various stages of negotiating their terms of accession with 
current members; some, like Algeria and China, first applied to become a contracting 
party to GATT 1947 more than ten years ago. The 33 applicants are a fairly diverse 
group and include most CIS countries (prominently, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus),  other 
transition economies in Asia and Europe (in addition to China, Vietnam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Albania), and an assortment of others, such as Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), 
Gulf states, African and Pacific island economies.  
Unless accession negotiations are accelerated, many of the benefits of WTO mem-
bership will be denied to the applicant countries for a prolonged period. This would 
be unfortunate because, particularly for the many transition economies among appli-
cants, accession to the WTO becomes one important focus of efforts to implement 
market-oriented reforms in a wide range of trade-related policies. Furthermore, even 
if there is no full-blown Millennium Round of trade negotiations, upcoming negotia-
tions among current WTO members will inevitably tie up political attention and admin-
istrative capacity that would be required to complete accession negotiations with the 
newcomers. 
 
Potential Stumbling Blocks in Accession Negotiations 
Overview   2
Accession negotiations deal with two broad types of issues. First, the WTO Agree-
ment and its Annexes contain mandatory rules on the conduct of a wide range of na-
tional trade-related policies, e.g. the extension of most-favoured-nation treatment to 
WTO members, national treatment of imported goods with respect to indirect taxes, 
the general prohibition on quantitative import restrictions, the protection of trade-
related intellectual property rights. Accession negotiations therefore involve a detailed 
review of the relevant legislation and practice of applicant countries. Current mem-
bers typically take the view that these must substantially be in line with WTO rules by 
the time an applicant joins the WTO. In recent accessions, the implementation of par-
ticular legislation was only deferred until after accession in very few cases, with the 
exact timing specified in the acceding country’s Protocol of Accession. 
Accession negotiations have been protracted because, compared with GATT 1947, 
WTO rules are far more detailed and cover a wider range of topics, such as interna-
tional trade in services (GATS) and intellectual property rights (TRIPS). Besides, 
many countries acceding to GATT 1947 in recent decades were developing countries 
that enjoyed considerable discretion in the conduct of their trade policies under Arti-
cle  XVIII of GATT  1947 and the amendments of 1965 (Part  IV: Articles  XXXVI 
to XXXVIII). Now, many candidates for accession to the WTO are transition econo-
mies that will be subject to the full set of (extended) disciplines of the WTO Agree-
ment.  
Second, accession negotiations deal with market access for imported goods and ser-
vices in applicant countries. Among GATT 1947 and WTO members, the protection 
offered to domestic firms has been progressively reduced as a result of successive 
rounds of trade negotiations; nevertheless, the level of protection still differs widely 
across WTO members. Relevant policy instruments include the level and dispersion 
of import tariffs for goods and market access commitments in services. Accession 
negotiations have become protracted, inter alia, because some current WTO mem-
bers are using their leverage in negotiations to extract concessions from acceding 
countries that go much further than the commitments made by current WTO mem-
bers at a similar level of economic development.  
Trade in Industrial Goods 
Acceding countries are required to bind their import tariffs, i.e. to commit themselves 
to not setting tariffs above specified levels. Typically, they also commit themselves to 
reducing bound tariff levels over an implementation period of mostly seven years   3
from their accession to the WTO. Negotiations between applicants and incumbent 
members focus on the import-weighted average tariff level, the dispersion of tariff 
rates across products, the number of zero-rated products, and the number of tariff 
lines for which rates are not to be bound (normally very few). 
The key demand by current WTO members has been that the major acceding 
economies (including China and Russia) bind their tariffs for industrial goods at 
roughly double the average rate for OECD countries (cf. Langhammer/Lücke 1999: 
 847). This would imply an import-weighted average of bound rates of no more than 
10 per cent. Among countries that recently joined the WTO, the simple average of 
individual tariff bindings was between 7 and 13 per cent for Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Lat-
via, Panama, and Bulgaria, and approximately 20 per cent for Ecuador and Mongolia 
(WTO 1999: Table 3).  
By contrast, developing country WTO members still impose higher tariffs even after 
implementing the Uruguay Round liberalisation. Finger et al. (1996) estimate the 
post-Uruguay Round trade-weighted applied average tariff on industrial goods for 26 
developing countries at 13 per cent; the corresponding average bound rate is 20 per 
cent. Furthermore, in many of these countries, tariff bindings for industrial products 
are not nearly comprehensive, whereas recently acceded countries as well as appli-
cants are strongly expected to bind all tariffs. 
While it can be argued that current members are applying double standards in mak-
ing far-reaching demands on applicants, a more benign view would focus on the im-
plications of their position for the evolution of the world trading system. In the Uru-
guay Round and successive negotiations, tariffs on industrial goods have been cut 
and even eliminated for some groups of products (e.g. information technology). Tariff 
bindings were made far more comprehensive even by developing countries which in 
the past had frequently either not bound tariffs at all or bound them at far higher lev-
els than were actually applied. Thus, in this benign view, current WTO members are 
requiring applicants to be at the forefront of global tariff liberalisation, rather than 
possibly entering the WTO with a protectionist agenda that would create obstacles in 
the way of further liberalisation. 
Agriculture 
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture has brought that sector back into the discipline 
of the multilateral trading system. Essentially, members’ commitments under the   4
agreement are in three broad areas: First, quantitative import restrictions are to be 
replaced by tariffs that are bound and subsequently reduced. Second, domestic pro-
duction subsidies that strongly impact upon trade (‘yellow’ subsidies) are to be bound 
and reduced over time. Certain other production subsidies that are regarded as not 
affecting trade (‘green’ subsidies) are not restricted, while yet another category (‘blue 
subsidies’) consists of measures that have been exempted only temporarily from re-
duction requirements. Third, export subsidies, while not outlawed as for industrial 
goods (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), are also to be bound 
and reduced. Here, the Cairns Group countries (mainly exporters of temperate-zone 
agricultural products, prominently including Australia) have gone further in committing 
themselves to the abolition of agricultural export subsidies. 
With respect to the tariffication of quantitative restrictions, applicant countries are in 
practice free to abolish these and propose ‘target bindings’ for their tariffs on agricul-
tural imports that need not be based on an exact calculation of the tariff equivalent of 
the quantitative restrictions. This procedure avoids the difficulties that most applicant 
countries would face in quantifying the effects of policy instruments based on weak 
data in the context of a rapidly evolving systemic transformation (for the bindings of 
recently acceded countries, see WTO 1999: Table 3).  
On domestic support, the binding of production subsidies entails the calculation of 
the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) for each basic agricultural commodity 
in accordance with Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. This raises a 
number of technical difficulties which are easily appreciated by inspecting the format 
to be followed (downloadable WTO document WT/ACC/4; see WTO 1999: p.17-18). 
Alternatively, acceding countries may make a de minimis commitment in accordance 
with Article 6.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, i.e. restrict ‘yellow’ domestic subsi-
dies for a basic agricultural commodity to 5 per cent of its value of production (10 per 
cent in the case of developing country members). Both routes have been followed by 
the recently acceded countries.  
Accession negotiations with respect to agriculture have become protracted mainly 
because some applicants were not willing to commit themselves to cut domestic sup-
port much faster (e.g. by taking de minimis commitments) than current WTO mem-
bers have done in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Similar problems arise with re-
spect to agricultural export subsidies where the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters   5
have pushed for an early elimination. While the Cairns Group countries have done so 
themselves (they tend to be highly competitive producers of temperate-zone agricul-
tural products), once again this demand goes further than most OECD countries (and 
the EU in particular) have been willing to go in restricting their own export subsidies.  
Services 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) represents a first step towards 
liberalising international trade in services. The agreement defines four potential 
modes of international service supply (cross-border supply, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence, presence of natural persons), lists the general obligations of 
members (such as MFN treatment, transparency, due process in domestic regulation, 
conditions for economic integration agreements), describes in detail the measures 
that are subject to members' market access commitments (such as limitations on the 
number of service suppliers or on the types of legal entities that may provide a ser-
vice), and lists various exceptions to GATS obligations (such as MFN exceptions, 
subsidies, public procurement, balance of payments restrictions, national security). 
Accordingly, WTO members' Schedules of Specific Commitments on Services con-
sist of three parts: first, horizontal commitments that affect all sectors, for example 
with respect to the movement of natural persons or payments abroad; second, sec-
tor-specific commitments, which may be differentiated by the four modes of supply; 
third, exemptions from MFN treatment. While the GATS represents the general 
framework for liberalisation in services, negotiations since the Uruguay Round on 
financial services and particularly on telecommunication have led to substantial fur-
ther liberalisation in these sectors. 
Incumbent WTO members expect applicant countries, as a precondition for WTO 
membership, to offer economically meaningful commitments at least for a limited 
number of important service sectors. Across service sectors, access to financial ser-
vices and telecommunication are of particular interest, not least because WTO mem-
bers have themselves negotiated further liberalisation in these fields after the conclu-
sion of the Uruguay Round. Because of the wide variety of sectors and the different 
modes of supply under GATS, it is difficult to provide a summary measure of the 
quality of the commitments agreed in recent accessions; a survey is contained in 
WTO (WTO 1999: Annex 2.3).   6
Reluctance to liberalise market access in services has been shown particularly by the 
transition economies among the applicants where the service sector suffers from a 
double handicap: First, the central planning system left many countries over-
industrialised with underdeveloped service sectors. This was true especially for fi-
nancial and business services that are now crucial for the functioning of a market 
economy. With free entry, local service firms would often be overwhelmed by interna-
tional competition. Second, the services that were provided in the past were usually 
produced under state monopolies. Hence, the opening of service sectors to interna-
tional competition, particularly through direct investment by foreign suppliers (com-
mercial presence), has met powerful political resistance.  
At the same time, the internationally competitiveness of manufacturing industries de-
pends increasingly on the firms enjoying access to high-quality services. Hence it is 
in the national interest of applicant countries (whatever resistance may be articulated 
by sectoral lobbies) to make economically significant commitments on service liber-
alisation. Where regional governments and non-governmental sectoral associations 
can control market access, it is also in the applicant countries' interest to ensure that 
these entities do not undermine the free supply of services across regions within 
each country. 
TRIPS 
The TRIPS Agreement mainly obliges WTO members to implement certain specified 
procedures for the effective enforcement of a wide range of intellectual property 
rights: copyright and related rights; trademarks; geographical indications; industrial 
designs; patents; layout-designs of integrated circuits. The Agreement builds upon 
and extends the provisions of the relevant international conventions (Berne, Rome, 
Paris conventions; Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits).  
The  effective implementation of the TRIPs Agreement encounters problems in both 
former socialist and in developing countries because both (though for different rea-
sons) traditionally tended to view intellectual property as a public, or partly public, 
rather than a private good. This is in contrast to the position of industrialised coun-
tries, which is closely reflected in the TRIPs Agreement, that intellectual property is a 
private good to be protected through appropriate legislation.  
In transition economies, most legislation on intellectual property rights is of very re-
cent vintage. Extensive advice received from the World Intellectual Property Organi-  7
zation (WIPO) has normally ensured that the new legal texts correspond to the provi-
sions of the relevant international conventions as well as the TRIPs Agreement. 
However, effective enforcement, which is central to the TRIPs Agreement, depends 
on effective institution-building in the legal system as a whole which, in turn, is part 
and parcel of the difficult process of systemic transformation. 
Many developing countries have traditionally been reluctant to extend full protection 
to intellectual property created mainly by firms in high-income countries, particularly if 
this would have enabled those firms to extract monopoly rents on the use of tech-
nologies deemed crucial for development (such as pharmaceuticals to combat dis-
eases). Problems in accession negotiations have arisen both from the reluctance of 
some applicants to fully account for the private good character of intellectual property 
rights in their legislation and from difficulties with enforcement. 
While the appropriateness of including intellectual property rights in the WTO frame-
work has been questioned, TRIPs are now, for better or worse, part of the multilateral 
trading system. Applicant countries have no choice but to bring their legislation and 
law enforcement into line with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. This may be 
helped by the fact that legitimate interests of developing countries are reflected in 
several relevant provisions. For example, national legislation may permit the use of 
intellectual property by third parties without the owner’s consent for public non-
commercial purposes such as disease control (Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
State Trading and Economic Transition 
The WTO agreements assume implicitly that WTO members are market economies 
where economic agents are free to act according to commercial considerations. This 
is clear from Article XVII of GATT 1994 which stipulates that state enterprises, as well 
as enterprises with exclusive or special privileges, should be notified to the WTO and, 
furthermore, should be run solely in accordance with commercial considerations. The 
logic behind this provision is that enterprises directed by the state, or endowed with 
exclusive or privileged trading rights, can undermine a member’s market access 
commitments if they act on any other than a strictly commercial basis. Furthermore, 
the centrally planned economies that were members of GATT 1947 (Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania) had special membership protocols that stipulated, inter 
alia, mandatory rates of import growth from GATT 1947 contracting parties; tariff   8
bindings or similar commitments would have been meaningless in centrally planned 
economies. 
State trading companies and exclusive trading rights are wide-spread in many appli-
cant countries. Some transition economies among the applicants have made only 
limited progress in privatisation so that a large share of GDP is still produced by 
state-owned enterprises. In many countries, access to natural resources and the dis-
tribution of strategic commodities such as mineral ores or fuel are traditionally a do-
main of the state. In the case of Saudi Arabia, state-trading companies are also in-
strumental in enforcing government controls on domestic sales of food and fuel prod-
ucts and setting domestic below international prices (online: WTO document 
WT/ACC/SAU/6, pp. 28-33). 
For accession negotiations, the crucial criterion for the compatibility of a given enter-
prise structure with WTO rules is not ownership, but the actual behaviour of enter-
prises. If state ownership is still wide-spread, applicants need to demonstrate that 
enterprises effect their purchases and sales solely on commercial grounds. In spite of 
some evidence of restrictive practices, international trade has been one area of sys-
temic reform in nearly all transition economies where progress has been relatively 
rapidly sustained. As a result, goods markets in transition economies have become 
more contestable, and the behaviour of existing enterprises is based increasingly on 
commercial grounds. 
One indication of continuing progress in this direction is an active programme of en-
terprise privatisation. Typically, therefore, applicants have provided detailed informa-
tion on their privatisation programmes during accession negotiations. Besides notify-
ing state trading enterprises and those with exclusive rights or privileges, transition 
economies acceding to the WTO have committed themselves to reporting regularly 
on progress in privatisation (for example, annually in the case of Kyrgyzstan). While 
there are no well-defined criteria that a privatisation programme needs to meet in or-
der to be considered in conformity with WTO rules, a regular reporting requirement 
improves the transparency of the incentive systems under which enterprises operate. 
Developing country status  
The WTO agreements acknowledge that developing countries may find it particularly 
difficult to fully meet WTO obligations with respect to trade liberalisation. Developing 
countries are therefore allowed greater freedom to restrict trade in exceptional situa-  9
tions (such as in the presence of balance of payments problems - Art. XII of GATT 
1994), to withdraw from existing commitments such as tariff bindings in order to pro-
tect infant industries (Art. XVIII of GATT 1994), or to provide domestic subsidies to 
agriculture (such as de minimis permissible subsidies of 10 per cent of the value of 
production - instead of the normal 5 per cent - under Article 6, para. 4.(a)(ii)(b) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture). Other special provisions for developing countries relate to 
extended implementation periods for various obligations. Further special provisions 
exist in favour of particularly poor, least developed countries. 
With respect to market access for their exports, developing countries benefit from the 
‘Enabling Clause’ negotiated during the Tokyo Round which permits WTO members 
to grant developing countries ‘special and differential’“ treatment with respect to im-
port tariffs under the Generalised System of Preferences. Regional preferential trad-
ing arrangements among developing countries are permissible even when they do 
not meet the requirements of Article XXIV of GATT 1994. 
All these provisions raise the obvious question of which countries are to be consid-
ered ‘developing’ and may thus benefit from more favourable treatment. Remarkably, 
criteria for developing country status have never been established either by the Con-
tracting Parties to GATT 1947 or by WTO members. Whether a country is considered 
‘developing’ depends on a unilateral decision of the trading partner (the US proce-
dure for the GSP), or on membership in the Group of 77 (the EU procedure for the 
GSP), or on self-selection for other WTO purposes. Only the term ‘least developed 
country’ is clearly defined in the WTO context in accordance with the list drawn up by 
the  UN. 
In accession negotiations, developing country privileges such as under Articles XII 
and XVIII of GATT 1994 have been claimed by China, in particular. This Chinese po-
sition was strongly resisted by current WTO members not least because of China’s 
relatively large share in world trade; resort to developing country privileges could 
have rendered Chinese market-opening commitments meaningless. In addition, the 
empirical evidence accumulated over the last several decades suggests that trade 
restrictions to promote infant industries or to protect the balance of payments provide 
no significant benefits to developing countries. Hence, applicants have nothing to 
lose from not using such measures.   10
The issue of extended implementation periods for developing countries is, in princi-
ple, more complicated. Developing countries (however defined) tend to possess lim-
ited administrative capacity so that extended implementation periods appear justified. 
However, in a formal sense, this issue will gradually die away because all implemen-
tation periods for new WTO members, as for current members, are calculated from 
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement (not from the date of accession to the 
WTO). This is now established practice and will most probably also apply to future 
accessions. In practice, therefore, all extensions to implementation periods for acced-
ing countries are now subject to negotiation. 
Key Country Perspectives 
China and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) 
More than 12 years have now passed since the accession working party for China 
was established back in 1987 under GATT 1947. Negotiations have dragged on tedi-
ously for a combination of reasons: China is a major exporter of traditional manufac-
tures (especially textiles and clothing; see Langhammer, Lücke, Table 2) and these 
‘sensitive’ exports are likely to grow further once restrictions stemming from the Multi-
Fibre Agreement are removed (Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing - 
ATC). The consequent prospect for political trouble at home has hardened the de-
termination of some current WTO member governments to push China, as a condi-
tion of WTO accession, towards a rather far-reaching liberalisation of market access 
for imported goods and services. With the large and growing size of the Chinese 
market, the liberalisation of market access is of far greater economic value to current 
WTO members than in the case of any other candidate country. However, pressure 
for rapid liberalisation was long resisted by the Chinese government which pointed to 
the ongoing systemic transformation of the country with all its attending problems, in 
addition to China's low per-capita income which would traditionally have been ac-
cepted, in a GATT/WTO context, as a justification for infant industry protection. 
As of the end of January 2000, China had concluded bilateral negotiations on its 
terms of accession with Japan, Canada, and the US. The agreement with the US is 
probably the most far-reaching one (White House Office of Public Liaison, 1999). Im-
port tariffs are projected to fall from an overall average of 24.6 per cent in 1997 to 9.4 
per cent by 2005, with an average of 7.1 per cent for certain US priority products. 
Market access will also be enhanced in a wide array of service industries, including 
telecommunications, banking (with special provisions for auto finance), distribution,   11
and motion pictures. At the same time, the US will be allowed to treat China as a 
non-market economy for another 15 years in anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
examinations, and the US may also apply a special safeguard mechanism (beyond 
that available under WTO rules) against imports from China for 12 years. 
It remains to be seen whether these terms, which were described as particularly ad-
vantageous to US firms by the US negotiators involved, will be acceptable to China’s 
other major trading partners, especially the European Union. While all commitments 
and concessions by China would automatically apply to all WTO members under the 
most favoured nation principle, other trading partners might emphasise market ac-
cess in other products of particular interest to them and seek concessions similar in 
value to those obtained by the US. Nevertheless, the bilateral US-China agreement 
makes the successful conclusion of accession negotiations in the foreseeable future 
more likely. 
Failure to conclude accession negotiations with China represents a critical, politically 
motivated accession barrier for Taiwan (officially called the Separate Customs Terri-
tory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu - ‘Chinese Taipei’). Most current WTO 
members recognise the People's Republic as the only legitimate government of 
China, and therefore accept the Chinese government's position that Taiwan should 
only accede to the WTO after China. This position cannot be justified from WTO rules 
which only require members to be in full control of all trade-related policies, which is 
the case for Taiwan (as it is for Hong Kong, which continues to be a WTO member). 
Substantially, negotiations in the accession working party for Taiwan, which started in 
1992, have been concluded without any major issues remaining unresolved.  
It is at present unclear what political leverage China will gain on the Taiwanese ac-
cession to the WTO if it formally joins the WTO before Taiwan is given the chance to 
do so. In spite of growing trade and capital flows, political relations between the two 
governments remain difficult. However, a further politicisation of Taiwanese WTO 
membership would be detrimental to the cause of freer trade in a rules-bound world 
trading system. Together, China and Taiwan account for approximately one half of 
the international trade of current non-WTO-members, and for an even larger share of 
their combined population and GDP (Langhammer/Lücke 1999: Table 1). Thus, their 
accession would bring the WTO a significant step closer to being a truly global institu-
tion.    12
Russia and other CIS countries 
Accession negotiations with the larger CIS countries, especially Russia and Ukraine, 
have not progressed far and, significantly, little new ground has been covered over 
the last two years. This is in marked contrast to several smaller former Soviet repub-
lics (Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, Latvia) as well as Mongolia which managed to accede to 
the WTO since 1995.  
In several ways, the slow pace of accession negotiations reflects the lack of progress 
made by most CIS countries in their transformation from a centrally planned to a 
market-based economic system. First, accession to the WTO means that a very wide 
range of trade-related policies need to be formulated consistently. This has been par-
ticularly difficult to achieve for many newly independent states whose administrative 
capacity is not well-developed. Even if appropriate legislation is written (in which for-
eign advisors may play a helpful role) and passed, the subsequent implementation of 
WTO-consistent policies is still less than automatic. For example, Kyrgyzstan is still 
officially a member of a customs union with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, al-
though it has bound its tariffs on goods at very low levels that the other three coun-
tries say they find unacceptable. 
Second, apart from unclear or conflicting legislation, even the implementation of ex-
isting, well-defined legal texts can be undermined by remnants of the old system 
such as pervasive and intransparent state interference in the economy. For example, 
various types of barriers to internal trade have been documented in the case of Rus-
sia (Berkowitz/DeJong 1998). In Belarus, direct administrative intervention in the 
management of enterprises is wide-spread and the resulting lack of transparency 
could easily undermine any commitments on market access that Belarus might un-
dertake. The fact that published legal texts may not represent the full range of meas-
ures that affect international trade inevitably complicates accession negotiations. 
Finally, the larger CIS countries have been rather reluctant to commit themselves to 
significantly liberalising access to their markets. For example, the initial import tariff 
offer by Russia would do little more than let bound rates decline to the current applied 
level during a seven-to-ten-year implementation period. Such insistence on protection 
for domestic firms, which extends to many service industries, contrasts sharply with 
the demands for market access liberalisation by current WTO members as well as 
the examples of countries that recently acceded to the WTO.    13
Least Developed Countries 
As of November 1999, out of a total of 34 applicants for WTO membership, 6 were 
defined by the WTO as least developed (Bhutan, Cambodia, Cap Verde, Lao PDR, 
Nepal, Vanuatu), with another 2 regarded as least developed by UNCTAD (Sudan 
and Western Samoa). In addition, 28 least developed countries (UNCTAD definition) 
are already WTO members (Langhammer/Lücke 2000: Table 1). Apart from a low 
per-capita income, common characteristics include geographic remoteness (i.e. large 
economic distance from major markets: island and landlocked states), reliance on a 
small number of export goods, mostly  raw materials, weak administrative capacity, 
economic and ecological vulnerability, lack of market-oriented institutional infrastruc-
ture and often political instability compounded by civil disorder.   
For such countries, the gains from WTO membership in terms of enhanced access to 
exports markets for traditional products are probably small. Raw materials already 
enjoy low or zero import tariffs in OECD countries; domestic supply bottlenecks (in-
cluding inadequate transport facilities) probably hamper export expansion more than 
policy-induced barriers on the demand side. Furthermore, although some raw materi-
als have been subject to anti-dumping (AD) procedures by industrial countries, least 
developed countries are typically not leading suppliers of specific raw materials and 
are therefore not much affected by AD measures. 
In spite of the obstacles mentioned, there are several good reasons for least devel-
oped countries to join the WTO and for current WTO members to support this proc-
ess. First, WTO membership requires transparency and consistency in a wide range 
of trade-related policies.  At the same time, WTO membership constitutes an external 
commitment to enforce these rules which may create additional momentum in favour 
of necessary economic reforms. For example, in many least developed countries, 
vested interests collect monopoly rents from their control of strategic sectors such as 
minerals, fuels, maritime and tourist resources. Such practices conflict with WTO 
rules on state trading, whose implementation would lead to enhanced transparency 
and an opening of markets. Furthermore, greater transparency would also encourage 
incoming foreign direct investment.  
Second, WTO membership may induce least developed countries to liberalise market 
access for imports, even if they are not necessarily required to do so as they benefit 
from ‘„special and differential treatment’“. Reducing thus the implicit tax on exports 
will not only increase allocative efficiency and stimulate export diversification. Market   14
opening also reduces the power of privileged traders that have been found to fre-
quently drive up import prices in the presence of high import tariffs (Yeats 1990). 
Third, the WTO offers some protection against unilateral pressure from powerful im-
porters as conflicts can be made transparent by invoking the dispute settlement 
mechanism. This is of particular relevance for small least developed countries which 
depend on transit routes through the territory of a large neighbour with whom they 
also conduct a major share of their international trade (such as Bhutan and Nepal 
with India, or Cambodia and Laos with Thailand).  
Policy Recommendations 
Our discussion suggests that accession negotiations can be streamlined and accel-
erated if several rules of thumb are obeyed whose political and economic logic re-
quires little justification. First, current members should not require applicants to liber-
alise market access substantially more than current members at a similar level of 
economic development have done. The essence of WTO rules is to ensure the 
transparency of national regulations and to provide for a progressive, negotiated re-
duction in the level of protection. There is no basis in WTO rules for requiring appli-
cants to adopt an untypically low level of protection at the time of joining the WTO.  
This rule of thumb could be questioned on the grounds that the outcome of US-China 
bilateral negotiations vindicates those who call for a tough stance by current WTO 
members: the far-reaching liberalisation of market access agreed by China will be of 
long-term benefit both for China itself and for its trading partners. However, this view 
would be short-sighted: First, accession negotiations with China could probably have 
been concluded long ago, with all the attendant benefits, had the US position been 
less out of touch with the trade regimes practised by other low-income countries.  
Second, the bilateral US-China agreement should not become a model for others 
because it is heavily lopsided: In spite of the far-reaching Chinese commitment to 
trade liberalisation, the agreement allows the US to continue to treat China as a non-
market economy in anti-dumping proceedings and to subject imports from China to 
special safeguards. To treat China as a non-market economy is logically inconsistent 
because, as a WTO member, China will be subject to the restrictions on state trading 
contained in Art. XVII of GATT 1994. Country-specific safeguards are fundamentally 
in contradiction with the most-favoured nation principle which requires safeguards to 
be applied without discrimination as to country of origin. The damage done to the   15
WTO system by thus bending its rules cannot be justified by the short-term gains that 
US firms will derive from higher protection against Chinese competition. 
As a second rule of thumb, applicant countries should fully accept the need for trans-
parency in their trade-related policies and for the full implementation of relevant WTO 
rules. For many applicants, improvements in the transparency, coherence, and con-
sistent implementation of trade-related policies will represent the most important 
benefit of WTO membership. By contrast, market access for exports will only improve 
marginally because most applicants already enjoy most-favoured nation status with 
their trading partners and often benefit from preferential market access under the 
Generalised System of Preferences. 
As a third rule of thumb, in negotiating their commitments on market access for im-
ported goods and services, applicants should consider benefits and costs to their 
economies as a whole, rather than narrow sectoral interests. More often than not, 
more liberal market access will be beneficial overall, even if it hurts particular sectors. 
This applies especially to liberalisation of trade in services. Under-developed busi-
ness service industries represent an important obstacle for growth in manufactured 
exports because access to high-quality services is a key requirement for successfully 
entering international markets for differentiated goods.  
As a fourth rule of thumb, negotiations can be accelerated if clearer priorities are set 
for necessary changes in national legislation and practice. While important adjust-
ments might well need to be made early on, extended implementation periods for 
non-essential items could be tolerated, given the complexity of WTO rules and limited 
administrative capacity of applicants. At the same time, the setting of priorities would 
focus the accession negotiations more clearly and thus ensure that applicants are not 
required to ‘shoot at moving targets’ as new demands are brought up time and again 




Some parts of this paper are updated from an earlier, much longer article by the same authors (Lang-
hammer, Lücke, 1999). Interested readers are invited to consult this longer article for a more detailed 
discussion of many issues raised in the present paper. The texts of WTO agreements mentioned in 
the paper as well as extensive additional information may be obtained from the WTO website: 
http://www.wto.org 
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